The right-of-first-refusal (ROFR) granted by the seller to a buyer that allows the favored buyer to purchase the asset at the highest price the seller can obtain from other competing buyers is common in auctions and other economic transactions. Yet the predictions of the theory on the impact of this hybrid mechanism on auction outcomes have not been tested using real-world transaction data. Hence, our knowledge of the practical economic impact of this hybrid auction that decouples price formation and allocation on bidder behavior and ultimately expected seller revenue and profit is quite limited. This paper presents the first empirical evidence on the effects of ROFR from 1012 first-price sealed-bid auctions for the sale of government owned land in Taiwan from 2007 to 2010. The main findings are as follows. An auction with the ROFR has significant negative effect on auction success, i.e. it decreases the likelihood of asset sale. Further, we find that the presence of ROFR in an auction: (i) discourages bidder entry into auction, (ii) creates incentive for bidders to bid less aggressively, and (iii) ultimately reduces seller expected revenue and profit. Interestingly, in majority of the margins of auction outcomes we analyzed the reserve price tends to offset the effects of the ROFR, and the ROFR in turn has significant negative effect on the level of reserve price set by the seller. Overall, the weight of our empirical evidence provides support for the branch of the theory that predicts negative impact of ROFR on auction outcomes. JEL Classification: D4, D44, D47, L11, D82, R3
Introduction
A recurring theme in the auction literature is how auction design itself affects the margins of auction outcomes (Vickery [1961] , Myerson [1981] , and Engelbrecht-Wiggans [1987] ). More specifically, attention has focused on how an auction should be designed to maximize seller expected payoff. In this context, an extant issue of great interest in the economics of applied auction design centers on the right-of-first-refusal (ROFR), an auction policy tool that allows the holder of the right to subsequently win the auction and acquire the asset simply by matching the highest bid of the other competing bidders in the auction. 1 An auction with ROFR is interesting especially when compared to a standard auction where the winner of the auction is ipso facto the highest bidder. Unlike a standard auction an auction with ROFR does not commit the auctioneer (seller) to selling the asset to the highest bidder (or purchasing from the lowest bidder in case of procurement auctions). Essentially, auctions with ROFR decouple price discovery (the bids received) from allocation of the asset.
This implies that the final winner is at the discretion of the seller and may not necessarily be the bidder with the highest valuation. At issue is how this applied auction design impacts entry into auctions, bidders' behavior and ultimately seller expected revenue and profit.
These are important empirical questions whose relevance transcends the immediate confines of auctions with ROFR to include the class of applied auction design that combine the market competition of pure auction and a non-competitive arrangement to determine the ultimate auction winner. 2 In this paper, we focus on the effects of auctions with ROFR on margins of auction outcomes.
It is worth emphasizing that in this hybrid mechanism the auction itself does not determine the winner; rather the auctioneer uses the price set by the auction to exert some control over who gets to be the ultimate winner. Although an auction with a ROFR is a form of favoritism bestowed the "favored" bidder, it is frequently found in a variety of economic transactions. It is often utilized in procurement auctions to award government contracts and by firms buying 3 inputs, where in this case the auctioneer is seeking a low price rather than a high price 3 .
Other economic transactions involving vast amount of money, for example transactions 0n interests in partnerships and closely held corporations 4 , real estate 5 , professional sports contracts 6 , entertainment contracts 7 , and venture capital financing are commonly consummated using an exchange mechanism with the ROFR. In all these economic transactions, at least one "favored" bidder (the right holder) has distinct comparative advantage over other bidders.
The prevalent use of the ROFR in economic transactions has spawned a burgeoning theoretical literature (which we review below) that provides predictions of the effects of this auction policy tool on the margins of auction outcomes. 8 Although the theory has been important in developing our understanding of this hybrid auction mechanism, it nevertheless offers competing predictions regarding its effects on auction outcomes. Remarkably, the competing and often conflicting predictions of the theory of the effect of ROFR have not been empirically tested using real-world transactions data. 9 Hence, the practical impacts of this auction policy tool on the outcomes of real-world economic transactions are still not well understood. Indeed, our knowledge of its practical economic effects is at best quite limited.
3 The National Park Service (NPS) has used the right-of-first-refusal to auction concession contracts on Federal lands since 1965. Concession contract is big business producing gross revenue of about $2.2 billion in 1994. In 2000 the NPS withdrew the right from all incumbent concessioners grossing $500,000 and above based on several General Accounting Office reports alleging that the right has detrimental effect on competition and revenue to the federal government. 4 It is a common feature in contracts for the eventual dissolution of business (See Brooks and Spiers, 2004) 5 ROFR is often found in real estate transactions either in the form of contractual clause or by legal statute. For example in the District of Columbia the Tenant Opportunity to Purchase Act gives the tenant ROFR when the owner wants to sell the property. Similarly, in both Britain and France property laws protect the tenant by granting her the ROFR in the sale of the rental property. Grooskopf and Roth (2005) analyze Britain's Landlord and Tenant Act of 1987 that stipulates that tenants of flats in England and Wales have the right to purchase their flat before the landlord can offer it to a third party. They find that the specific characteristic of the right can work to disadvantage the right holder 6 In the National Football League (NFL) the incumbent team has the right to match the best offer a player has from another team to retain the player once he becomes a restricted free agent. 7 In 2001 Paramount Studios, the producer of the successful TV show Frasier, renegotiated its expired contract with NBC, where NBC, as the incumbent network at the time held the ROFR. NBS was given 10 days to match the terms offered by CBS (See Grosskopf and Roth 2009) 8 One conventional justification offered for granting ROFR in economic transactions is that it serves to level the playing field between a weak bidder and a strong bidder that is more likely to have a high valuation for the object (Lee, 2008 ). Yet another explanation for ROFR is to mitigate breakdown in bargaining and exit from a market (Walker 1999) . 9 In an experimental setting, Grosskopf and Roth (2005) find that the right may disadvantage the holder. Although their findings are insightful the experiment was based on a special type ROFR (a combination of right of first offer and right of first refusal) and instead of an auction they used sequential negotiation format. This paper contributes to the empirical auction literature by being the first to provide empirical evidence on the effects of the ROFR on auction outcomes from 1012 first-price sealed-bid auctions for the sale of government-owned lands in Taiwan conducted between 2007 and 2010. At a policy level, the motivation for our analysis is to provide empirical evidence regarding the impact of the ROFR on a rich set of auction outcomes aiming discriminate among the competing predictions highlighted by theory. Specifically, we use our unique data set to fill the empirical void by investigating the impact of auctions with ROFR on several margins of bidders' behavior and seller payoff expectations including: (1) the probability of auction success or asset sale, (2) the number of bidders that enter the auctions, (3) bidding behavior within the auctions, and (4) seller expected revenue and profit.
Intuitively, since the auctions we analyze also uniformly employ the reserve price in combination with the ROFR, we provide insights on the determinants of reserve price set by the seller; in particular we shed light on whether the ROFR influences the level of reserve price set by the seller. 10 Our key findings regarding the effects of ROFR on the margins of auction outcomes emphasized by theory are as follows. First, the ROFR has significant negative effect on the probability of auction success, i.e. it decreases the likelihood of asset sale. To the best of our knowledge this is the first direct empirical evidence of the negative impact of ROFR on auction success. Second, ROFR reduces the number of actual bidders that enter the auctions, creates incentive for bidders to bid less aggressively within auctions, which we find, ultimately reduces expected seller revenue and profit. These findings are the more economically important given that the vast majority of procurement auctions actually used in practice are hybrid mechanisms (like auction with ROFR) that decouple price formation and allocation, which creates flexibility for the auctioneer to accomplish other goals such as establishing long-term relationship.
Third, and interestingly, in all the standard margins of auction outcomes we investigate, except bidders' entry into auctions, the reserve price offsets, although partially, the negative effects of the ROFR. Fourth, the effect of the ROFR on auction outcomes is also sensitive to market and asset characteristics such as location of the property to be auctioned and land use type. In this regard, there are important market dynamics and asset differences that affect 10 Lee (2008) argues that the ROFR and reserve price are complementary auction policy tools for reducing asymmetry (leveling the playing field) between weak bidders and strong bidders in certain situations. Further, the two auction policy tools may exhibit counterbalancing effects in terms of impact on auction outcomes.
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entry into auctions and ultimately seller expected payoff, quite apart from those emanating from the ROFR and the reserve price. Finally, on the determinants of the reserve price, we find among other factors, the ROFR reduces significantly the level of reserve price set by the seller.
The empirical results are robust after controlling for possible endogeneity of the reserve price, and the corner solution outcome associated with response variables (dependent variable) in successful auctions. 11 Mapping our overall results back to theory, on the substantive issue regarding the effect of ROFR on auction outcomes, we can discriminate in favor of the branch of the theory that predicts that the ROFR will have negative effect on margins of auction outcomes including seller expected revenue and profit. Hence, the conclusion we draw from the empirical evidence is that it may not be in the best interest of the seller to grant the buyer the-right-of-first refusal, unless there is some upfront compensation from the right holder to the seller, or some other unstated objective such as using the mechanism to facilitate long-term relationship between the buyer and the supplier in procurement process.
Our work contributes to the empirical literature on the impact of auction design in several ways. First, we present for the first time empirical evidence from 1012 first-price sealed-bid auctions of the effects ROFR on several margins of auction outcomes that theory labelled but waiting for empirical validation. Indeed, as stated earlier there has been an upsurge of interest in theoretical work on the effect of auctions with ROFR, but this type of mechanism has not been analyzed empirically. Second, our findings shed light on the possible economic consequences of a class of hybrid auction mechanisms most often used in procurement practice that combine pure auction with non-competitive bidding to determine allocation.
Hitherto our understanding of the economic effects of such auction mechanisms that favor a bidder(s) on auction outcomes is limited.
Third, this paper provides empirical evidence on the possible interactive or counterbalancing effects between the ROFR and reserve price highlighted in the theoretical literature.
Specifically, we provide empirical support for the proposition that depending on the degree of asymmetry between a weak bidder (who is favored) and a strong bidder, the ROFR when combined with the reserve price, would tend to offset each other's effect on auction outcomes.
Fourth, we also contribute to the growing empirical literature that investigates whether the 6 behavior of bidders is consistent with standard auction theory. In this regard, we find empirical evidence consistent with auction theory in that higher reserve price discourages entry of bidders, but increases the winning bid and ultimately seller's expected revenue and profit. However, the reserve price is not independent of the number of bidders, contrary to prescription of theory. Further, the reserve price set by the seller correlates negatively with the ROFR. To the best of our knowledge this is the first empirical evidence of the impact of ROFR on the reserve price set by the seller.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the theoretical predictions of the effects of ROFR on auction outcomes. Section 3 discusses the institutional features of Taiwan government land auctions, and presents our analytical model of bidder behavior and seller expected payoff in the auctions. Section 4 describes the data and provides descriptive statistics on various dimensions of the sample. Section 5 discusses the results of our multiple regression analysis on the impact of the ROFR and reserve price on the margins of auction outcomes. Section 6 uses the results from this study to evaluate some major economic transactions that used the ROFR to accomplish the transaction, and the final section concludes with a summary and direction for future research.
Theoretical Background
Theory provides competing predictions regarding the impact of the ROFR on the margins of auction outcomes we analyze in this paper. Moreover, theory is essentially silent on whether the ROFR influences the level of the reserve price. For ease of discussion we have broadly grouped the theoretical co0ntributions into two: papers that predict granting the ROFR can increase the seller expected revenue or the joint profit of the seller and the right holder, and those that predict that the presence of ROFR in auctions reduces seller expected payoff or has negative effects on auction outcomes.
In a first-price procurement auction, Burget and Perry (2009) show that the expected joint surplus of the buyer and the seller is maximized if the seller is granted the ROFR than would be the case using a standard first-price auction. This result is conditional on the right being auctioned off to the highest bidder beforehand, which suggests that granting the ROFR for free never benefits the seller. Choi (2008) discusses the effect of ROFR in a modified twobidder auction where the right-holder gets to observe the bid of the non-favored bidder before making her own. He shows that when the favored bidder wins the auction, the ROFR increases the joint profit of the seller and the favored bidder at the expense of non-favored bidder. However, the paper also finds that ROFR may at times lead to inefficient allocation( decrease social welfare) because the favored bidder may win the auction even if her private valuation is less than that of the non-favored bidder.
A recent paper by Elmaghraby et al (2011) models the ROFR in a two-stage sequential auction with earlier release of information. They show that the seller can increase her revenue compared to a single auction or sequential auction executed without ROFR.
However, as stressed by the authors this result hinges on information flow and the timing of its release. In a procurement setting, Lee (2008) models the effects of ROFR in a first-price sealed-bid auction with two asymmetric bidders, weak bidder and strong bidder. He shows that when the asymmetry between the weak bidder and the strong bidder is sufficiently large, granting the weak bidder the ROFR levels the playing field, thereby eliciting more aggressive bidding from the strong competitor, which maximizes the seller's expected payoff. Further, he concludes that at low to intermediate levels of asymmetry the reserve price offsets or neutralizes the effects of a ROFR. In an asymmetric procurement auction, Rothkopf et al (2003) find that offering some degree of favoritism to disadvantage bidders in the form of adjusted bids or subsidy generally benefits the seller. This is in the sense that the subsidy makes the economically disadvantage bidders more competitive, which in turn induces the other bidders to bid more aggressively thereby lowering project cost and enhancing economic efficiency.
Theoretical work that predicts negative impact of ROFR on auction outcomes or seller expected payoff includes the following papers. Atozamena and Weinschelbaum (2006) , assuming independent private values (IPV), conclude that no auction mechanism that includes the ROFR is capable of maximizing the joint expected surplus of the seller and right holder. Moreover, such auction design would be suboptimal. Bikhchandani et al (2004) discuss the impacts of the ROFR on auction outcome in a second-price sealed-bid auction where bidders observe private signal about their valuations. They conclude that the ROFR is inefficient in that the bidder with the highest value does not necessarily win and it benefits only the right holder at the expense of the seller and other competing buyers. Moreover, when bidders' valuations are correlated, the ROFR exacerbates the winner's curse. Based on their results, Bikhchandani et al caution that sellers should exercise extreme caution when considering whether or not to grant the ROFR.
In a paper prompted by the decision of U.S. National Park Service (NPS) to eliminate the ROFR in some of its concession contracts, Chouinard (2005) concludes that the NSP is 8 indeed better off without the ROFR in its concession contract auctions. Specifically, Chouinard shows theoretically that the expected value to the seller of a standard auction without ROFR exceeds that of an auction with ROFR. Kahan et al (2012) discuss the ROFR in a multiple-buyer sequential bargaining setting (not auctions). They find that the right not only transfers benefits from the other buyers to the right-holder, but may also force the seller to make suboptimal offers.
Overall, one proposition of theory is that when there is sufficient asymmetry of some form among bidders granting the ROFR to disadvantage bidders offsets the asymmetry, which presumably leads to positive impact on auction outcomes. An alternative conjecture is that when there is little or no asymmetry among bidders the ROFR imposes a constraint so that its presence in an auction negatively impact auction outcomes such as entry and ultimately seller expected revenue and profit. The competing hypotheses of the theory regarding the impact of ROFR as an auction policy tool makes the question of who wins versus who loses in auctions with ROFR an empirical one. We contribute to the auction literature by providing credible empirical evidence of the causal effects of ROFR on the margins of bidder behavior and seller expected payoff, and in the process discriminate among the competing predictions of the theory. Additionally, the theory stresses the interaction between the ROFR and the reserve price as auction policy tools for leveling the playing field between asymmetric bidders.
We shed light on the nature of this possible interaction between the two auction policy tools as well as whether the ROFR influences the level of reserve price set by the seller.
Institutional Auction Background, Models of Bidder Behavior and Seller

Expected Value
In this section, we first provide a description of the institutional setting of Taiwan auctions for sale of government-owned lands. Auctions have been used to sell several millions of square meters of government-owned land involving vast amounts of money. We use the knowledge gained to model bidder strategy and seller expected payoff in subsequent auctions aiming to capture the key institutional features of the auction design. In particular, the models of bidder strategy and seller expected revenue reflect the role of the two auction policy tools, ROFR and reserve price, on auction outcomes.
Institutional Background of Taiwan Land Auctions
Since 2002, auctions have been used to sell government-owned lands in Taiwan. The auction mechanism used is a first-price sealed-bid auction. An interesting feature of these auctions is that the ROFR is granted to some potential buyers of the property to be auctioned. As stated earlier this right allows the right-holder the opportunity to buy the property being auctioned simply by matching the highest price obtained by the government from a third party in the auction. In addition to the ROFR, another applied auction design uniformly found in the auctions is the reserve price, the price below which the government will not sell the real estate asset.
The Taiwanese ROFR is granted by legal statute as contained in various articles of the Land Act of 1930. 12 As prescribed by the relevant articles of the Act, the ROFR is invoked in the following situations: (1) sale or disposition by co-owner(s) of his/her interest in the co-owned property; (2) sale by landlord of a property under lease, and (3) The Taiwan Land Act is a broad statute that inter alia governs all manner of property rights, restrictions on property rights, circumstances under which private land becomes vested in the government, land use type, situations that give rise to right-of-first-refusal in the sale or disposition of property rights, etc. Articles 34-1, 73-1, 104, and 107, respectively deal with right-of-first-refusal in connection with the sale of land or building under co-ownership, government owned land or land whereof private ownership is extinguished and vested in the government, leased land or building, and leased farm. The Act was first promulgated on June 30, 1930 and became enforceable on March 1, 1936. In nearly a century of its existence the Act has been amended ten times; the latest amendment occurred on June 15, 2011. the right in the property being sold. The property right could be co-ownership right in a freehold interest, right of use or usufructuary right as in leasehold, and even an extinguished private property right that was vested in the government. In all these cases the Taiwan statutory ROFR explicitly gives the right holder a comparative advantage by allowing the right holder the opportunity to purchase the property being sold simply by matching the highest bid from other bidders. Further, in some situations especially in the case of sale of property under fractional co-ownerships the practice of granting the ROFR helps consolidate ownership under single entity. In this regard an inherent economic rationale for granting the ROFR is to preserve economies of scale in land resource utilization.
Periodically, branch offices of the National Property Administration of the Taiwan Ministry of Finance conduct public auctions for the sale of government-owned real estate for nonpublic use. Potential bidders must submit bids in prescribed form accompanied by a deposit (10% of the reserve price) in the form of money order or bank draft. 13 This payment allows bidders to determine their private valuation of the property being auctioned based on the information released by the administrative office and their own private information. The information released by a branch office includes reserve price, the presence or absence of the ROFR on the asset to be auctioned, location of the land, land area in square meters, floor area if there is a building on the land, and the date for the auction.
During the bid-tender period the administrative office conducting the auction is not permitted to open bids and is explicitly forbidden from revealing bid information. Bids are opened publicly on the day of the auction to determine the winning bid. The winning bid is the highest bid among all bids submitted. If there is more than one bid with the highest price, the winner is awarded by lottery. Then if someone holds the ROFR on the property to be auctioned the process enters its second stage where the holder of the right gets to observe the winning bid. If the right holder matches the winning bid she acquires the property at the winning bid. If not the non-favored bidder with the highest bid acquires the property and pays the winning bid price since this is a first-price sealed-bid auction.
The typical bidder or buyer in such auctions is a property developer buying the real estate for subsequent conversion into residential, commercial or mixed use and not for resale of the land acquired. Given the absence of resale motive independent private value (IPV) seems appropriate as paradigm governing the auctions for the sale of government land in Taiwan.
Moreover, from an economic perspective, it is likely that ex ante bidders are asymmetric in terms of value proposition, expertise, and production efficiencies, relating to the ultimate highest and best use for the acquired real estate, further justifying the IPV assumption.
Based on these arguments we consider asymmetric IPV in modeling bidder strategy and expected seller payoff in auctions with and without ROFR, where the seller imposes also the reserve price.
Modeling Bidder Strategy and Seller Expected Value
As the basis for our analytical model, we want to capture the essential institutional features of the setting for the Taiwan government first-price sealed-bid auction in which potential bidders know that at least one of the bidders is favored in some of the auctions. Specifically, we first model an equilibrium bidding strategy in which a favored bidder(s) is granted the ROFR by statute which gives her an opportunity to win the auction by matching the highest bid of a competing non-favored bidder. This setting implies that the favored bidder has the advantage of knowing the private bid of the non-favored competitor at some stage in the auction process. We then model and contrast this with the bidding strategy in a standard first-price sealed bid auction with no ROFR. From the equilibrium strategies we sketch out the seller's expected value under the auction with ROFR and under a standard first-price sealed bid auction with no ROFR. We then deduce which of the two auction designs result in higher payoff to the seller.
Our approach in modeling the bidder's strategy follows Chouinard (2005) , Choi (2009) and Lee (2008) . There are three risk-neutral profit maximizing players, a favored buyer (BF) with a statutory granted ROFR, a non-favored buyer (BNF) with no ROFR, and the government, the seller (S), who wants to sell an indivisible real estate asset. Each bidder has a private value v drawn independently and uniformly from a common distribution F(•) with density function f(•) and support [0, 1] . This information is common knowledge among the players.
However, each bidder's value depends on the bidder's private information that is not known by the competing bidders.
A strategy for a bidder that maps her true value v to a non-negative bid b is a function s(v)=b.
We make the following two assumptions about the bidder's strategy: (1) s (•) is a differentiable function that is strictly increasing, such that two bidders with different values will have different bids, and (2) s(v) ≤ v for all v, so that bidders can shade down their bids, but will never bid above their true values. Upon payment of a deposit both the favored bidder, BF, and the non-favored, BNF, learn their private valuations, vf, vnf, respectively. Prior to the start of the auction a reserve price or minimum bid, bm, is announced by the auctioneer, and no bid below this minimum bid will be accepted. If there is no bid ≥ bm the auction fails and the government retains the asset for a later auction.
3.2.1: Bidder Strategy in Auctions with ROFR
We envisage a two-stage first-price sealed-bid auction as follows: (1) BNF, the non-favored bidder, bids bnf; (2) the favored bidder observes bnf and decides whether or not to match bnf; and (3) BF matches bnf and acquires the asset at bnf, otherwise BNF acquires the asset at bnf.
In this setting, BNF realizes that the only way she can win the auction is if her bid, bnf, is greater than the valuation of the favored bidder, vf. Otherwise the favored bidder will always win the auction by exercising her ROFR and matching bnf. Then the expected profit of the
, is the surplus or profit from the auction and
is the probability of winning the auction. In this regard the non-favored bidder's probability of winning in the interval [0, 1] is exactly bnf.
Now if BNF does win, she receives a payoff of vnf -s(bnf).
Taking all of these into account, the expected payoff for the non-favored bidder can be written as:
From equation (3) the solution for the optimal bid yields bnf = 1/2vnf. Thus the optimal strategy for the non-favored bidder knowing that she is competing with a favored bidder with private value drawn uniformly at random from the interval [0,1], is to bid half her true value, if the favored bidder is expected to do so as well. The non-favored bidder's complete optimal strategy, therefore is
The favored bidder, BF, will maximize the expected value of winning in stage two of the process. 14 At this point the favored bidder knows bnf and her own private value signal, vf.
The favored bidder will exercise the ROFR if conditional on her own value (vf) and the nonfavored bidder's bid (bnf), her expected valuation is larger than the non-favored bidder's bid.
Hence, the favored bidder's equilibrium optimal strategy is, Note that if the non-favored bidder bids an amount larger than the favored bidder's value, the favored bidder will not match; the non-favored bidder wins and the game is over.
However, because the favored bidder simply has to match the non-favored bidder's bid she can win even with lower valuation as shown in the complete strategy of the favored bidder above. Since the favored bidder can win despite her lower valuation the ROFR creates inefficiency in allocating the asset to her, the size of which is given by
(see Choi, 2009 ).
3.2.2: Bidder Strategy in Auctions without ROFR
In auctions without ROFR the bidders are somewhat symmetric as far as the auction design and we now assume that bids are submitted at the same time. It is well known in the auction literature that in a first-price sealed-bid auction with IPV and n bidders, the optimal strategy is to bid s (vi)=(n-1)/n•v, where v is the private valuation of the asset randomly drawn from the probability distribution function (see Milgrom (1987 Milgrom ( ,1989 , Milgrom and Weber (1982) , McAfee and McMillin (1987), and Wofstetter (1996) ). Hence, it is optimal for each bidder to shade her bid down by a factor of (n-1)/n, given that everyone else does the same. Under this circumstance the optimal bidding strategy for both bidders in our two-bidder scenario without ROFR translates to s(v) = v/2, i.e. each bidder should bid half her private valuation.
Consequently, the complete bidding strategy for both bidders is
Note that this equilibrium bidding strategy is the same as that of the non-favored bidder in the case of an auction with ROFR and a reserve price described above. So the non-favored bidder's bid is the same as when confronted with a favored bidder with ROFR.
3.2.3: Seller Expected Value under both auctions
In the context of a first-price sealed-bid auction with ROFR the seller expected revenue depends entirely on the highest bid which in turn depends on highest value. Then the price received by the seller is always the non-favored bidder's bid (whether the favored bidder matches or not) and the expected revenue of the seller is solely dependent on the bid function of the non-favored bidder. And given that the highest bid represents how much the nonfavored bidder is willing to pay for the asset, the expected value, E (VS), of the auction with ROFR to the seller can be written as 15
where, P is probability.
The expected value to the seller in the standard auction without ROFR can be written as
Note that the expected value to the seller in the standard auction equals the sum of bids of the favored bidder and the non-favored bidder, unlike the case of the auction with ROFR where the expected revenue to the seller depends solely on the bid of non-favored buyer.
Thus by logic, the expected value to the seller under the auction with no ROFR is larger than under the auction with ROFR. And it is larger by the amount the favored bidder bids over the non-favored bidder.
Given the results in (7) and (8) we expect the impact of ROFR on auction outcomes such as probability of auction success, entry of bidders, expected seller revenue and profit to be negative.
Further, we note that the apparent reduction in the seller expected payoff engendered by the ROFR is most likely captured by the favored bidder if she matches. That is the favored bidder gains at the expense of at least the seller and possibly both the seller and non-favored bidder.
As previously modelled another feature of Taiwan government land auctions is the reserve price, which is made public before the commencement of an auction. Lee (2008) discussed above finds that when the seller grants the ROFR and simultaneously imposes a reserve price, the reserve price improves the expected profit or surplus of the seller from the auction and also counterbalances the effects of the ROFR, especially at high degrees of asymmetry between a weak bidder and a strong bidder. It remains to be seen whether empirically the effects of the ROFR and reserve price on the margins of auction outcomes such as the probability of auction success or sale of the asset, number of bidders that enter auctions, bidder behavior within auctions, expected seller revenue and profit are in fact offsetting.
Finally, it is likely that setting the reserve price in the presence of the ROFR would require knowing the circumstances of the bidders, the nature of the asset being auctioned, as well as the market condition for the asset being auctioned. The literature on optimal auction design (e.g. Myerson(1981) , Riley and Samuelson (1981) ), suggests that the seller should set a sizable reserve price, one that exceeds her own private value for the asset in order to maximize expected revenue. However, in practice there may be reasons why a seller may ostensibly select "suboptimal" reserve prices. For example, while the optimal reserve price in IPV auctions should not depend on the number of bidders, if there are very few bidders the reserve price may very well be the key determinant of the winning bid or sale price at the auction, and hence the seller expected revenue. This may cause the reserve to correlate positively with the number of bidders.
In the context of the auctions analyzed in this paper the "leveling the playing field effect" of the ROFR may cause bidders to behave differently from what standard game theoretic models suggest. Indeed, when the reserve price is too high such that bn  vf, the favored bidder should decline to match (not bid at all). The seller then presents a take-it-or-leave-it"
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proposition to the non-favored bidder, where she strategically bids the reserve price or minimum bid, bm, so long as her private value, vnf > bm, and otherwise decline to bid. Thus it is important to understand how reserve prices are set in Taiwan government land auctions particularly when the auction mechanism includes ROFR. As a point of exit we end our empirical analysis by analyzing the determinants of reserve price in Taiwan government auctions with the view to isolating the nature of the effect of ROFR (if any) on the reserve price set by the seller.
Data Description and Descriptive Statistics
We analyze data from Taiwan on 1012 government auctions conducted between January 2007 and October 2010. The assets for sale are mainly undeveloped lands. The auction mechanism used is first-price sealed-bid auction. A key feature of the auction design which constitutes the major focus of this research is the ROFR found in some of the auctions.
Additionally, all the auctions in our sample have reserve price.
The auctions are conducted in three regional locations including Taipei metropolitan area consisting of Taipei city and suburbs, Taichung metropolitan area consisting of Taichung city and suburbs, and Kaohsiung metropolitan area consisting Kaohsiung city and suburbs. Data were tediously collected on an original sample of 2639 auctions from the websites and files of the branch offices of the NPA. After purging the sample for missing data which were concentrated exclusively in Kaohsiung auctions, the final sample size was reduced to 1012 clean auctions from Taipei and Taichung metropolitan areas only. 16 The data provide details of all real estate assets to be auctioned whether the auction was successful or not and contains information about: (1) property attributes such as land use type, location, size in square meters; and (2) markets that may significantly differ in terms of market architecture, intrinsic value of the asset to seller and potential buyers, potential number of entrants, and ultimately demand for the asset to be auctioned.
4.1: Summary Statistics
We begin analysis of the data by providing summary statistics for the total sample shown in Table 2 To summarize we make two observations. First, it would seem that properties slated for government auctions are heterogeneous and high valued assets. Second, the variability in the number of bidders may be due to heterogeneity of auctioned properties, different valuations of the bidders, and the presence of ROFR. auctions with the ROFR on these margins of auction outcomes. We also note that auctions with no ROFR are more successful (42%) compared to auctions with ROFR (30%).
Panel B of
In Panel C we focus on descriptive statistics based on the location of the property to be auctioned for the whole sample. On average auctions attract more bidders if the property to be auctioned is located in the city compared to a suburban location (3.11 versus 1.38), on the order of 2.25:1. The seller, on average, sets the reserve prices for properties to be auctioned that are located within the city at a multiple of 3.7 times of those located in the suburbs.
Whereas the winning bid for a property located in the city is more than twice the mean reserve price, the winning bid for a property located in the suburb is only about 1.8 times the reserve price. Although, properties to be auctioned located in the suburbs do command less premium, they nevertheless, are on average much bigger in terms of square meters than their city counterparts. These observations make sense given the scarcity of land in urban areas and the fact that land use developments in urban areas (core city) are typically characterized by intensive margins as opposed to extensive margins in the suburban areas.
Finally, Figures 2, 3 , and 4 respectively plot mean reserve price against the number of bidders, seller expected revenue (winning bid) against the mean reserve price, and seller expected profit (winning bid minus reserve price) against the reserve price. We can make several observations from the figures. First, in Figure 2 , reserve prices increase with the number of bidders. This descriptive evidence contradicts standard auction theory. Davis et al (2008) suggest that when the number of bidders is small as in this study the optimal reserve price becomes even more critical in maximizing seller revenue. In this situation, most likely it is the reserve price that determines the sale price (or seller expected revenue) at the auctions.
As such the number of bidders may correlate with the reserve price. Second, consistent with auction theory, both seller expected revenue and seller expected profit increase with reserve prices, as revealed in Figures 3 and 4 , respectively.
5.0: Estimation Results
In this section, we report estimates from multiple regression models that test predictions of theory on the effects of ROFR on auction outcomes. Specifically, we provide empirical evidence on the impact of the auction policy tool of interest, ROFR, and the reserve price, on five margins of auction outcomes including the probability of auction success, the number of bidders that enter the auctions, bidders' behavior within the auctions, expected seller revenue, and expected seller profit. We also provide empirical evidence on the determinants of reserve prices set by the seller. With regard to the reserve price we are interested in knowing how the seller sets reserve prices because theory predicts that reserve price can help maximize seller revenue, but may also discourage entry, and that reserve prices should be independent of the number of bidders. Moreover, in the context of this study, theory also suggests that the ROFR (our auction tool of primary focus) when combined with the reserve price may act as complements or offset each other's effects on auction outcomes. Thus, we are interested in knowing whether the ROFR influences the level of reserve price set by the seller.
5.1: The Probability of Auction Success or Asset Sale
Ultimately, the success of an auction would depend on bidder entry and bidding behavior.
Our empirical model assumes the benefit, B, and cost, C, of entry and bidding are functions of the attributes of the auction design, X, in particular the ROFR and reserve price, the attributes of the asset to be auctioned including market condition, V. Let
where w and u are error terms. The potential bidder enters the auction and bids in the auction when
where Z is the short-hand notation for the summation of the attributes, X and V. Equation (11) states basically that an auction is likely to be successful (i.e. result in asset sale) if the net benefit (B-C) from entry and bidding in the auction is positive.
One approach to the problem of relating the auction outcome probabilities (i.e. successful or failed auction) to the underlying characteristics of the auction design and the asset/market condition is the conditional logistic function (McFadden, 1974 (McFadden, , 1976 .
 is the i th auction's outcome index, which measures the likelihood that the auction is successful or not successful (i.e. whether the asset is sold or not). While the index cannot be measured directly it is a function of the observable determinants of the auction decision process, i.e. the characteristics of the auction design and asset/market condition. We approximate the index linearly as follows:
The variables of (13) are defined in Table 1 . A problem arises in estimating equation (13) due to potential endogeneity of the reserve price (RP). If the reserve prices set by the seller reflect some quality aspects of the property to be auctioned that are not observable by the researcher neglecting the unobserved attribute(s) in any estimation will bias the coefficients.
Although we observe some characteristics of the property to be auctioned chances are that we do not observe all. A potential omitted variable is the intensity of the land use which is difficult to control. To correct for the endogeneity of the reserve prices and obtain consistent estimates of its effects we use the Smith and Blundell (1986) two-step procedure. The first step consists of a linear regression of the reserve price on property attributes and asset size, a variable that is likely to affect reserve price, as instrumental variable. Indeed, an F-test shows a significant partial correlation between reserve prices and the instrumental variable.
In the second step the residuals from the first step OLS, labeled RPRD in equation (13) above are calculated and included in the second stage regression. Table 3 reports the estimated logit coefficients for the probability of auction success where some of the auctions have the ROFR. Column 1 in the table shows the results from OLS regression of equation (13), which does not control for endogeneity of the reserve price, and column 2 shows the 2SLS regression results that adjusts for possible endogeneity of the reserve price. Column 3 reports calculated adjusted probabilities or elasticities designed to reveal changes in probability of auction success for interesting values of the significant variables based on the 2SLS regression. The results show that ROFR has a significant negative effect on the probability of auction success (χ 2 =4.16). Holding constant other auction design variables and attributes of the asset to be auctioned and market condition, the presence of ROFR in an auction lowers the probability of auction success by 12%, compared to a standard auction with no ROFR. This result suggests that the presence of ROFR in auctions will lower the probability the asset is sold.
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Turning attention to the other important auction policy tool, reserve price, we see that the coefficient on RP is positive but insignificant in the OLS regression. However, after correcting for possible endogeneity of the reserve price, the coefficient on the residuals from the first step regression (RPRD) is positive and highly significant, suggesting that the reserve price is indeed endogenous. In general, theory suggests that a higher reserve discourages entry of marginal bidders and decrease the probability of sale. Hence, this result is inconsistent with standard auction theory.
We rationalize the result as follows. First, intuition suggests that a higher reserve price may also signal the seller's private information about quality and the true value of the asset to be auctioned. In this regard, a higher reserve price or an unexpected increase in the reserve price may signal a higher valuation of the asset to be auctioned, which may encourage (rather than discourage) bidder entry, especially entry of strong bidders (those with higher valuation). Moreover, bidder behavior is likely to be more strategic when a higher level of reserve price from the seller signals higher valuation for the property to be auctioned, hence the positive effect of reserve price residual on the probability of auction success.
The estimated probability of auction success equation also includes asset characteristics such as land use type, location of the property and a proxy for market condition at the time of the auction. It is clear that an auction is less likely to succeed if the property to be auctioned is located in the suburbs; the probability of auction success is 23% lower if the land to be auctioned is located in the suburb as shown by the calculated adjusted probability. An auction is more likely to result in asset sale if the property to be auctioned is designated for residential development. Likewise, an auction is more likely to succeed if the condition of the market condition is more favorable as measured by the housing return index (HRI). In estimating the auction success equation, we centered the HRI variable by subtracting the mean return index for all returns across all auctions, i.e.
).
( HRI HRI  The probability of auction success, or the probability that the auction will result in asset sale increases by 9% in hot market.
5.2: Bidder Behavior within Auctions and Seller Expected Value
Prior to this study, the predictions of theory as to whether the ROFR induces bidders to bid more or less aggressively has not been empirically verified using real-world transaction data.
Likewise, the ultimate effect of the ROFR on seller expected revenue and profit has not been empirically documented. More generally, there is now an elevated interest in empirically 22 testing whether the behaviors of buyers and sellers in auctions accord with auction theory in general. We contribute to this research by specifically estimating the causal effects of the ROFR, reserve price and other relevant factors on four margins of auction outcomes. These include (1) the number of bidders that enter the auction, (2) in-auction bidding behavior as measured by the bid premium, (3) seller expected revenue conditional on asset sale, (4) and seller expected profit conditional on auction success. For each of the four models of auction outcomes the multiple regression equation to be estimated takes the following form:
where j=1,2,3,4 denotes a specific auction outcome as stated above. With the exception of the auction outcome relating to the number of bidders that enter the auctions, we also include as regressor the centered number of bidders,
) (
NBDRS NBDRS 
, by subtracting the mean number of bidders in all the auctions from the number of bidders variable before estimating the other auction outcomes. Again all the variables are defined in Table 1 .
In addition to the endogeneity problem highlighted earlier the estimation of these models of auction outcomes is complicated for another reason. In each of the four models of auction outcomes we observe a continuous non-zero value for the dependent variable, i.e. the number of bidders, bid premium, winning bid or expected seller revenue and expected profit, only for the successful auctions. For the unsuccessful auctions the optimal choice for some potential bidders for the response variable (dependent variable) takes a value of zero with positive probability, whose exclusion in OLS estimation can result in inconsistent and biased estimates of the coefficients, 
Bidder Entry into Auctions
17 Note that the issue here is not data observability problem as in censoring or truncation. Rather the dependent variable (.e.g. the auction outcome for some potential bidders) takes a value of zero with positive probability when the auction fails, but is a continuous random variable for other bidders when the auction is successful and the asset is sold. variables are now significant, and the coefficient on the reserve price is now negative and significant. It is clear from the regression results that granting the ROFR discourages entry of bidders into auctions as reflected by the negative and significant coefficient on the ROFR variable, which is consistent with the theory that the right may discourage the entry of marginal bidders. The negative coefficient on the reserve price suggests that higher reserve price might discourage entry of potential and actual bidders.
This result is consistent with standard auction theory that suggests that higher reserve price might weed out marginal bidders. Table 4 shows that with the exception of the coefficient on reserve price, the absolute magnitudes of the Tobit estimates are at least twice as much as the OLS estimates. For example, the Tobit coefficient on ROFR reported in column 2 is roughly six times that of the OLS estimate. However, it is not informative to conclude from this that the Tobit model implies a much greater response of number of bidders to ROFR. To interpret the coefficients correctly we multiply the Tobit estimates by the adjustment factors given in Table 4 to obtain the marginal effects or elasticities for important variables. The adjusted marginal effects are reported in last column of Table 4 . For example conditional on the number of bidders being positive (i.e. successful auctions), an auction design with ROFR (with other variables at their means) decreases expected number of bidders that enter the auction by -18% (.3227x-0.5606 = -0.1809). However, unconditionally or accounting for both potential bidders who did not enter the auction as well as those who did enter and bid, we see that the magnitude of the marginal effects of each independent variable is larger than when we condition only on those who entered the auction and bid. For example, the marginal effect or elasticity of ROFR is now -24% (0.422x-0.5606 = 0.2366), which is comfortably above the OLS estimate.
As a final observation
Turning to the marginal effects of other variables, although the coefficient on reserve price is negative and significant its marginal is clearly small. The location of the property to be auctioned has a dramatic effect on the number of bidders who enter the auction; compared to a city location suburban location of auctioned land, on average, reduces the number of bidders by 39%, unconditionally. In contrast, if the land is designated or zoned for a residential real estate development, the number of bidders who enter the auction increases by about 28%. Taken together, these results suggest that there are important market dynamics and asset differences that affect entry into auctions, quite apart from those emanating from auction design elements such as the ROFR and the reserve price. Table 5 provides evidence on how bidders bid when faced with auction design that includes both ROFR and reserve price. Our measure of bidders' behavior (more or less aggressive bidding) is the ratio of the winning bid (sale price of the asset) to the reserve price. Column 1 in Table 5 shows the results from the OLS regression of equation (14), conditional on observing the winning bid or selling price. This regression does not control for corner solution outcome or endogeneity of the reserve price. The estimation results show that while the ROFR is negative and insignificant the reserve price has a significant and positive impact on the degree of aggressive bidding, although the coefficient is small.
Bidders' Behavior within auctions
The second column of Table 5 shows the results of the standard censored Tobit regression that also adjust for endogeniety of the reserve price of bidding behavior in the presence of the ROFR and the reserve price based on the entire sample (successful and unsuccessful auctions). The coefficient on the ROFR is now very significant (t-value =-2.31) and the reserve price residual is significant as well. Indeed, accounting for the auctions with no bidders (unsuccessful auctions) as well as successful auctions is important in that the coefficient on the land use dummy (LSDUM) and the centered house return index ) ( HPRI HPRI  are now both significant.
To shed more light on the results, we note that the presence of the ROFR, the variable of interest, decreases aggressive bidding by about 9% (-.2710x.3354 =0.0909), conditional on asset sale; unconditionally the corresponding figure is about 12%. Similarly, accounting for auction success (asset sale) and auction failure (no asset sale), the marginal effect of reserve price though is 6.2%. Finally, column 3 of Table 5 repeats the regression model (14) auctions. This innovation has a dramatic effect on both the impact of the ROFR and reserve prices, as both variables cease to be significant. Interestingly, the coefficient on the centered number of bidders is positive and highly significant, suggesting bidders bid more aggressively as the number of bidders increase; the increase in aggressive bidding is about 3.5% (0.4748x0.0733=0.0348), for each additional bidder. This result is consistent with the observation of Bulow and Klemperer (1996) that adding one more bidder is preferable over setting an optimal reserve price, since aggressive bidding is more likely to increase seller revenue.
Expected Seller Revenue and Expected Seller Profit from Auctions
In this section, we examine the causal effects of auction policy tool of interest, right-of-firstrefusal, and the reserve price on seller expected payoff. We undertake this exercise by estimating equation (14) for the winning bid, our proxy for seller expected revenue, and the winning bid minus reserve price, our proxy for seller expected profit, as dependent variables. Table 6 provides empirical evidence of the effects of ROFR and reserve price on seller expected revenue, while controlling for other contributing factors, and Table 7 provides complementary evidence on the effects of the two auction policy tools on seller expected profit. As before, we have taken time to correct for the two complicating problems that plaque our estimation of the regression equations. From the two tables we can make a number of observations: First, the ROFR clearly reduces seller expected revenue and profit.
Based on the results of standard censored Tobit regression shown in the last but one column, the ROFR reduces expected revenue and expected profit. Holding constant other variables the presence of ROFR reduces the winning price or expected seller revenue by NT$0.40 and seller expected profit by NT$0.07, when we account for both successful and failed auctions.
This empirical evidence provides support for the cluster of theory of ROFR that predicts the right will reduce expected seller payoff. Thus the right-of-first-refusal may be inimical to seller welfare, unless there is some upfront compensation from the right holder to the seller. Second, consistent with standard auction theory the reserve price increases both seller expected revenue and seller expected profit, conditional on asset sale and unconditionally.
The effect of first-stage residuals of the reserve price on expected seller revenue or the winning bid is NT$0.185 (0.463x0.4004) for every NT$1.0 increase in reverse price. As in our earlier results of auction outcomes these results suggest that the reserve price partially counterbalances the negative effect of the ROFR on seller expected revenue Next, we examine the effects of other independent variables on expected seller revenue and profit. Both seller revenue and seller profit increase with the number of bidders consistent with auction theory. The coefficient on the centered number of bidders is positive and highly significant in both the seller expected revenue and expected profit regressions. As shown by the calculated marginal effects in Tables 6 and 7 (last 
Determinants of seller Reserve Price
The objective of this final empirical analysis is to understand and provide empirical evidence on how the seller sets reserve prices in auctions wherein some of the auctions offers the auctioneer some control in determining the winner, i.e. price formation and allocation are decoupled. The motivation for this exercise comes from two sources. First, the empirical literature has documented that in practice some bidder behaviors are not in accordance with prescriptions of auction theory. Second, to this point our own analyses show that with the exception of one auction outcome, the reserve price positively impacts every other margin of auction outcome we investigate, in sharp contrast to the negative effects of the ROFR on the same auction outcomes. Third, intuitively, the presence of the ROFR complicates the realworld auction environment we analyze; thus it would be interesting to find out whether this auction policy tool influences how reserve prices are set by the seller. Myerson (1981) and Riley and Samuelson (1981) Table 8 reports the regression results on the determinants of the reserve price. From the Table we can make the following observations. First, reserve prices are clearly not independent of the ROFR; all else equal the ROFR decreases the reserve price by NT$23.0, per NT$100 of reserve price. Second, contrary to theory the reserve price is not independent of the number of bidders either. The coefficient on the centered number of bidders,
, is positive and significant, suggesting that for each additional bidder the seller increases the reserve price by NT$4.63, per NT$100 of the reserve price.
Although the behavior of the seller in setting the reserve price is inconsistent with the theory as it relates to the impact of the number of bidders it may be a rational response to the distribution of bidders across auctions. For example, our data show that more than one third of the successful auctions, i.e. auctions that result in sale, had only one bidder. In this situation the number of bidders will likely influence the reserve price and ultimately seller expected revenue and profit. Next, the effects of asset characteristics on the reserve are obvious as revealed by the significant coefficients on land area (LNDA) and the location dummy (LOCDUM), although they have opposite effects. For each additional square meter increase in asset size, the seller increases the reserve price by NT$66.0, per NT$100 unit of reserve price; and relative to a city location, the reserve price declines by NT$107 (per NT$100 unit of reserve price) if the land to be auctioned is located in the suburbs.
To account for the possibility of learning and responding to changing market conditions in setting the reserve price, we included two measures of market condition: a broad measure using year dummies as proxy and a narrow measure based on the house return index centered on its mean, as independent variables. Table 8 shows that over time the seller increases reserve prices rather considerably; for example relative to the base year (2007) , is negative and significant (t-value = -4.0) suggesting that the seller decreases reserve prices slightly by -NT$4.19 as market returns rise above their mean, per NT$100, which seems counter intuitive.
Discussion
This section revisits our findings in light of some major economic transactions where the ROFR was utilized as mechanism for allocation. Thus far our empirical results strongly suggest that the presence of ROFR in auctions reduces the likelihood of asset sale, discourages bidder entry into auctions and ultimately reduces seller expected revenue and profit. At a policy level, our analysis and results have broad relevance on real-world economic transactions that use ROFR to complete transactions and could be used to shed light and better understand the practical effects of this hybrid mechanism on bidders' behavior, entry and ultimately the auctioneers expected payoff.
To illustrate, consider first the solicitation for bids for the sale of Miami Dolphins Sports franchise in 1994. At that time Wayne Huizenga, the founder of Blockbuster video, owned a 15% stake in the sports franchise and also strategically had a ROFR on the sale of the franchise. Rather inauspiciously, the sale attracted only one other buyer whose bid was considered to be considerably below the valuation of the football franchise and the holder of the ROFR matched the only bid (see Bikchandani et al 2005) . 18 Our empirical evidence anticipates and is consistent with the outcome of this economic transaction in showing that the ROFR discourages entry into auctions, creates incentive for bidders to bid less aggressively; thereby reducing seller expected revenue and profit. 19 Next, consider also the case 0f the U.S. National Park Service concession contracts. 20 The GAO in several reports suggested inter alia that the ROFR is to blame for the fewer number of bidders, non-competitive bids and ultimately the meager rate of return for the government on the presence of ROFR in concession contracts that are up for renewal. 21 Although there was little empirical evidence to back this claim the issue became so contentious that in May 2000, the NPS eliminated the ROFR in concession contracts with gross revenue of $500,000 and above. In retrospect this study provides empirical support for the action taken by the NPS, in showing that the presence of ROFR indeed be anti-competitive in decreasing the number of bidders that enter the auctions and ultimately decreases seller expected surplus or profit.
The evolution of the 2003 Airbus Industries invitation for bids to supply jet engines for its military transportation aircraft, A400M, was in effect a bid solicitation with implicit ROFR granted to the domestic bidder, if not in name. EuroProp, the "domestic favored" bidder was allowed to revise its original bid, but Pratt & Whitney, the most competitive bidder, was not granted similar opportunity. EuroProp won the procurement auction contract to supply the jet engines worth over €4.0 billion (US$5.6 billion) simply by matching the bid of the non-favored bidder, Pratt & Whitney. Our empirical evidence has relevance on the political economy of this politically sensitive and high stake economic transaction. Based on our empirical results, we conjecture that in this particular instance the ROFR may have played a role akin to a reserve price in helping to establish the most competitive bid price to match above which Airbus will not procure the engines from Euro Prop. 22 .
Finally, although, we do not provide empirical evidence a standard prediction of the theory (and ours as well) is that a rational holder of the ROFR will match only if her valuation is above the winning bid submitted by a non-favored bidder [See for example Bkhchandani et al (2002) , Choi (2009 ), Chouinard (2005 and Lee (2008) 21 See for example GAO (1996) , Testimony before the Subcommittee on National Parks and Public Lands, Committee on Resources, House of Representatives 22 A somewhat similar situation was the sale of bankrupt South Korean brewery company, Jinro, where the domestic bidder, Oriental Brewery, after submitting its bid learned the terms of the bid submitted by the more competitive bidder, Coors. Subsequently, Oriental Brewery apparently favored by the seller was allowed to revise its bid, presumably matching that of Coors and was accepted as the winning bid. This paper contributes to the auction literature by providing the first empirical evidence of the effects of ROFR on several margins of auction outcomes, based on 1012 auctions for the sale of Taiwan government-owned lands. In order to discriminate among the competing predictions of theory regarding the impact of ROFR, we estimate several multiple regressions of auction outcomes. We find that the presence of the ROFR in auctions: (i) decreases the probability of auction success or asset sale, (ii) discourages bidder entry into auctions, (iii) induces bidders to bid less aggressively within auctions, and (iv) decreases both seller expected revenue and expected profit, conditional on the asset being sold, as well as unconditionally.
Interestingly, with the exception of entry into auctions, the reserve price, another important auction policy tool uniformly present in all the auctions we analyzed, partially offsets the negative effects of ROFR on standard auction outcomes. Also remarkably, on the determinants of the reserve price set by the seller, the ROFR is shown to have a negative impact on the level of reserve prices. On the substantive question of the nature of the impact of the ROFR on auction outcomes, the logical conclusion from the synthesis of our empirical evidence is that we can discriminate in favor of the branch of theory that predicts that the ROFR will have negative effects on auction outcomes, especially seller expected payoff.
At a policy level, the collective results of our analysis would seem to question the wisdom of granting the ROFR, since all the margins of auction outcome we analyze suggest that the seller would most likely not be able to maximize her expected value in this particular case.
This raises the existential question of why the ROFR is often found in economic transactions involving vast sums of money. In the auctions we analyzed the ROFR is granted by statute perhaps to accomplish other goals besides maximizing seller expected revenue. Further, as noted earlier in all cases where the statutory ROFR is invoked in the sale of real estate in Taiwan, the common thread and hence the raison d'être for granting the right appears to stem from the fact that the potential recipient of the right already has some property right in the property being sold.
the incumbent network at the time held the ROFR. NBS was given 10 days to match the terms offered by CBS (Grosskopf and Roth 2009). Further, in the context of Taiwan land tenure and real estate transactions granting the ROFR may have an economic motive in that it may serve to consolidate fragmented property rights in fewer hands which may give rise to economies of scale resulting in more efficient land utilization. Indeed, Taiwan is known for its fractional ownership of property rights and previous land tenure reforms have attempted to consolidate property rights. Heller (1998) suggests that too many property rights (anticommons) in the same contiguous land might hamper economic efficiency. If this perspective is correct then a pure standard auction is not flexible enough to promote the goal of consolidating property rights in fewer hands to achieve economies of scale in land utilization.
Nevertheless, if bidders are symmetric granting the ROFR to one of the bidders by legislative fiat would seem to impose a constraint on economic transaction which reduces seller expected revenue and profit, although it may accomplish other objective.
Finally, our results may suggest a future research direction. A ubiquitous result of our analysis is that the reserve price tends to counterbalance the negative effect of ROFR. Hence, a potential direction of future research on auction design could concentrate on developing a hybrid mechanism that preserves the "benefit" of ROFR, e.g. promoting economies of scale in land development, but mitigate its detrimental effects on the seller. Indeed, based on our results the policy of granting ROFR by the seller may be locally optimal if it is combined with the reserve price, given the counterbalancing effect of the latter policy tool. This is in the sense that the reserve price may tilt the mix of auction entrants towards more experienced, knowledgeable bidders (with high valuation for the asset being auctioned), which may mitigate the reduction in expected seller revenue or profit induced by the presence of the ROFR. 
HPRI
House price return index minus the average house return index
Seller Expected Revenue
Winning bid (highest price) at each auction (NT$MM).
Seller Expected Profit
Winning bid minus the reserve price (NT$MM)
Bid Premium
Winning bid divided by the reserve price (proxy for bidders' behavior in bidding, i.e. aggressive or less aggressive bidding). The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the number of bidders in an auction. ROFR dummy equals 1 if someone has the right of first refusal on the land and 0 otherwise. RP is reserve price or minimum bid set by seller measured in NT$1MM. RPRD is reserve price residual from first stage OLS regression. LSDUM dummy equals 1 if land use is residential and 0 otherwise. HRI is the current quarter's house return. LOCDUM is location dummy which equal 1 if the land to be auctioned is located in the suburb and 0 otherwise. We control the fixed effects by including the year dummies. Model 1 is OLS. Model 2 is standard censored Tobit regression corrected for possible endogeneity of the reserve price. Adjustment factor1 and adjustment factor2 used to adjust Tobit MLE coefficients conditional and unconditional on asset sale or auction success, respectively. R 2 for Tobit model is computed by correlating the dependent variable with the predicted value and squaring the result. * * * , * * , and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The dependent variable is the log winning price divided reserve price (bid premium). ROFR dummy equals 1 if someone has the right of first refusal on the land and 0 otherwise. RP is reserve price or minimum bid set by seller measured in NT$1MM. RPRD is reserve price residual from first stage OLS regression. (NBDRS-) NBDRS is the number of bidders minus the average number of bidders across auctions. LSDUM dummy equals 1 if land use is residential and 0 otherwise. HRI is the current quarter's house return. LOCDUM is location dummy which equal 1 if the land to be auctioned is located in the suburb and 0 otherwise. We control the fixed effects by including the year dummies. Model 1 is OLS. Model 2 is standard censored Tobit regression corrected for possible endogeneity of reserve price. Model 3 is standard censored Tobit regression, corrected for with the endogeneity of reserve price, and with centered number of bidders as additional regressor. Adjustment factor1 and adjustment factor2 are as described previous tables. R 2 for censored model is computed by correlating the dependent variable with the predicted value and squaring the result. * * * , * * , and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The dependent variable is the log of winning price. ROFR dummy equals 1 if someone has the right of first refusal on the land and 0 otherwise. RP is reserve price or minimum bid set by seller measured in NT$1MM. RPRD is reserve price residual from first stage OLS regression. (NBDRS-) NBDRS is the current quarter's house return index minus the average house return index. LSDUM dummy equals 1 if land use is residential and 0 otherwise. HRI is the current quarter's house return. LOCDUM is location dummy which equal 1 if the land to be auctioned is located in the suburb and 0 otherwise. We control for fixed effects by including the year dummies. Model 1 is OLS. Model 2 is standard censored Tobit regression corrected for potential endogeneity of reservation price. Model 3 is standard censored Tobit regression, corrected for possible endogeneity of reserve price, and with centered number of bidders as additional regressor. Adjustment factor1 and adjustment factor2 for reporting the marginal effects of independent variables conditional and unconditional on auction outcome, respectively. R 2 for censored model is computed by correlating the dependent variable with the predicted value and squaring the result. * * * , * * , and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The dependent variable is the log of dollar premium measured as the difference of winning price and the reservation price. ROFR dummy equals 1 if someone has the right of first refusal on the land and 0 otherwise. RP is reserve price or minimum bid set by seller measured in NT$1MM. RPRD is reserve price residual from first stage OLS regression. (NBDRS-) NBDRS is the current quarter's house return index minus the average house return index. LSDUM dummy equals 1 if land use is residential and 0 otherwise. HRI is the current quarter's house return. LOCDUM is location dummy which equal 1 if the land to be auctioned is located in the suburb and 0 otherwise. We control the fixed effects by including the year dummies. Model 1 is OLS. Model 2 is standard censored Tobit regression and is corrected with the endogeneity of reservation price. Model 3 is standard censored Tobit regression, corrected with the endogeneity of reservation price, and with centered number of bidders as additional regressor. Adjustment factor1 and adjustment factor2 are recommended by Wooldridge (2002) for reporting the marginal effects on the expected value for y for uncensored observations and marginal effect on the expected value for y (censored and uncensored). R 2 for censored model is computed by correlating the dependent variable with the predicted value and squaring the result. * * * , * * , and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The dependent variable is the natural log of the reservation price (NT$1MM). ROFR dummy equals 1 if someone has the right of first refusal on the land and 0 otherwise. LDA is the natural logarithm of land area. LSDUM dummy equals 1 if land use is residential and 0 otherwise. (HRI-HRI )is the current quarter's house return-the average of quarterly house return. LOCDUM is location dummy which equal 1 if the land to be auctioned is located in the suburb and 0 otherwise. We year dummies to control for fixed effects. * * * , * * , and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
